The 16th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory: Matching, Auctions, and Market Design

Wed, 06/07/2005 to Fri, 15/07/2005

Matching, Auctions, and Market Design

General Director:
Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University

Eyal Winter, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem


This summer school will focus on theoretical and experimental studies on a variety of matching and auction environments. Recently there have been opportunities for game theorists interested in auctions and matching markets to help design markets. The practical problems posed by these markets have raised new theoretical questions and shed light on old ones. The matching and auction literatures have been drawn closer, and both have begun to confront more difficult problems. The lectures will discuss new developments in the theory and practice of market design, as well as various markets in distress, to see what they can tell us about how various market institutions cope with obstacles to reaching an efficient outocme.


Program >



Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
Benny Moldovanu (Bonn University)
Muriel Niederle (Stanford University)
Michael Ostrovsky (Harvard University)
Parag Pathak (Harvard Business School)
Elliott Peranson (National Matching Services, Toronto)
Alvin Roth (Harvard University)
Tayfun Sonmez (Koc University, Istanbul)