25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory: Matching and Market Design

Date: 
Mon, 23/06/2014 to Wed, 02/07/2014

Matching and Market Design

 

General Director:

Eric Maskin (Harvard University)

Organizers:

Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
Eyal Winter, Codirector (The Hebrew University)

 

Program >

Lecture Recordings >

 

Models of matching---in which agents are paired with one another to undertake transactions---have played an important role in contemporary economic theory. Matching algorithms have proven valuable in many real-life applications, including the assignment of students to schools, medical residents to hospitals, and organ donors to recipients. Matching theory has also helped illuminate thorny problems such as inequality and unemployment. The summer school will place greatest emphasis on design issues, but will touch on other aspects of matching as well.

 

List of speakers:

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University
Itai Ashlagi, MIT
Eric Budish, Universty of Chicago
Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Jacob D. Leshno, Columbia University
Eric S. Maskin, Harvard University
Paul R. Milgrom, Stanford University
Elliott Peranson, National Matching Services, Inc
Assaf Romm, Harvard University
Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University

 

Special thanks: The Rilin Enterprises Fund at Harvard University (to Prof. Maskin)

 

economics