Design of Economic Mechanisms and Social Choice

General Director:
Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University

Co-director:
Motty Perry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

 

An important development in economic theory over the last thirty years has been the design of systems of information and rewards to achieve desired social aims, such as economic efficiency. Closely related has been the analysis of social aims derived as an aggregation of individual preferences. A powerful tool has been the theory of games under incomplete information; but the issues in mechanism design (sometimes called "implementation") have a different character, since the game is to be designed and not given to begin with. The theory is especially important in applications to the regulation of industry and to the design of international organization of firms. The lecturers include both some of the founders of the fields studied and outstanding younger scholars working in them.

 

Speakers:

Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University
Mathias Dewatripont, Université libre de Bruxelles
Leonid Hurwicz, University of Minnesota
Eric Maskin, Harvard University
Bezalel Peleg, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Kotaro Suzumura, Hitotsubashi University