Photo courtesy: University of Toronto

Jennifer Nagel, a past fellow of the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies and a member of the research group "Practical and Theoretical Rationality: A Comparative Study," has recently shared insights into one of philosophy of language's most enduring puzzles, the Gettier Problem, in an interview with The New Statesman.

The Gettier Problem, named after American philosopher Edmund Gettier, challenges traditional understandings of Knowledge, particularly the notion that "justified true belief" is a sufficient definition.

In the interview, Nagel discusses how Gettier's work published in a 1963 paper, though brief, created a seismic shift in epistemology by demonstrating cases where individuals could hold true beliefs based on justified reasons, yet still fail to truly "know" something.

She explores the complexity of these cases, where a belief appears justified but rests on a coincidental truth—and relates them to broader questions of how we perceive and categorize knowledge in real-life situations.

Nagel also delves into the philosophical responses to Gettier's problem, explaining how contemporary thinkers like Timothy Williamson argue that knowledge is not reducible to a combination of belief and justification, but rather a primary concept in its own right.

Her interview serves as a fascinating reflection on how a seemingly simple thought experiment can unsettle foundational ideas in philosophy of language, leading to ongoing debates on the nature of knowledge.