Research Group
Yosef Salmon
Gary Anderson
Eyal Benvenisti Leads New Center for Democracy Studies
Eyal Benvenisti, a past fellow of IIAS, has inaugurated the Center for Applied Research on Risks to Democracy at Tel Aviv University. This center, which he heads, aims to identify and address the challenges facing contemporary democratic societies. Benvenisti emphasizes the importance of understanding and mitigating risks to democracy, promoting civic education, and fostering public engagement to rebuild trust and community cohesion in Israel and globally.
Mechanisms of Canon-Making in Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean Societies (Research Group Conference)
Algorithmic Game Theory: The Next Decade
[RG # 123] Algorithmic Game Theory: The Next Decade
March 1 - August 31, 2011
Organizers:
Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University)
Noam Nisan (The Hebrew University)
At the approximate age of ten years, it seems that the field of Algorithmic Game Theory is maturing. The goal of this group is to elucidate the main challenges of the field and attempt to chart the future course of the field for the next decade.
Some research topics that will be explored:
- Networks with contagious risk, the different aspects of how the evaluation of the Generalized Second Price mechanisms are used for selling ads on the Internet, and the understanding of the performance of simple auctions and modeling auctions used in practice (Eva Tardos)
- Interviewing in stable matching problems and cost-sharing mechanisms (Nicole Immorlica)
- Sketching valuation functions, the equilibria of simple market mechanisms, and optimal multi-item auctions (Noam Nisan)
- Auction design for agents with uncertain, private values (Anna Karlin)
- A general framework for computing optimal correlated equilibria in compact games, computing Nash equilibria of action-graph games via support enumeration, mechanical design and auctions, and computational equilibrium analysis of voting games (Kevin Leyton-Brown)
- Envy-free mechanisms for multiunit auctions with budgets, cost sharing games with capacitated network links, and game theoretic perspectives of the facility location problem (Michal Feldman)
- Bargaining in networks (Amos Fiat)
Ronit Matalon
Anna Karlin
Fred Landman
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